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1 INTRODUCTION
Botswana has been held up as a success story for the
performance of its drought relief programme during
the 1980s'. Whilst famine swept through so many
other African countries during the widespread
drought of the mid 1980s, Botswana stood out for its
achievement in preventing famine. The country suf-
fered from a prolonged and severe drought from
1981/82 to 1987/88. But there was no significant
evidence of starvation deaths nor distress migration.
Nutritional status deteriorated, but was contained.
This is widely attributed to the timely and adequate
provision of drought relief. All the more remarkable
in Botswana's case was its ability to respond to the
drought using domestic resources. Although it did
receive food aid, most of the relief programme was
nationally funded. In the categorization of emergen-
cies, Botswana has suffered from slow onset drought
emergencies, but unlike a number of other African
countries it has not been affected by war.
Much of what has been written, complimenting
Botswana's drought relief programme, has focused
on the first half of the 1980s, when the human relief
components were most significant, before the agri-
cultural recovery programme got underway. In
1990, a detailed evaluation was carried out of the full
stretch of eight years of drought relief and recov-
ery programmes (DRP), from 1982 to 1990. This
article draws extensively on the results of that
evaluation (FSG et al. 1990).
According to the most important criterion, of pre-
venting famine, Botswana's record is impressive.
But how has it fared in achieving the more difficult
challenge of linking relief and development? For
example in terms of:
a integrating the institutional arrangements for
running a large-scale and prolonged relief operation
into existing government institutions and structures;
b implementing a relief programme which is com-
patible with long term development objectives; and
'example, Holm and Morgan 1985; Quinn et at., 1988; Drèze and
Sen 1989.
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c implementing development plans and pro-
grammes which:
take the likelihood of a drought shock into
account; and
help to 'drought-proof' the rural economy.
These are the issues addressed in this article. It is
argued that in some respects Botswana has been
successful in linking relief and development, for
instance in the way that the DRP was managed at
national level by existing government departments,
and in the way that some parts of the relief pro-
gramme were expanded from the basics of a social
security system. Other aspects have been more
problematic. There are examples of how relief
interventions displaced on-going developmentwork.
And the prolonged life of the DRP has tended to
mask underlying structural problems of poverty and
unemployment in the rural economy. Dealing
with these are the challenges now facing Botswana
in the 1990s.
Are there lessons that can be transferred from Bot-
swana to other African countries, or is it a special
case? Botswana is unusual in the African context,
because of its wealth and rapid economic growth
over the last 25 years, its small population of less
than 2 million, and its democratic system of govern-
ment since Independence. The DR? is also unusual
compared with most other African relief operations,
because it has not been heavily dependent on donor
aid, because of the range of different relief and
recovery interventions beyond straightforward food
distribution, and because the programme has been
running for 11 out of the last 14 years. It is a unique
case, but there are still some transferable points of
interest for other countries.
The article begins with some background informa-
lion about the state of the economy, poverty and
national food security in Botswana. The DR? is re-
viewed briefly, mainly focusing on the 1980s. The
following three sections address the issues raised
above.
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2 THE ECONOMY, POVERTY AND FOOD
SECURITY IN BOTSWANA
2.1 The 'economic miracle'2
Since it gained Independence in 1966, Botswana has
achieved one of the fastest economic growth rates
in the world. From being one of the poorest coun-
tries in the mid 1960s, it now has one of the
highest per capita incomes in Africa, of $2,590 in
1991. Botswana's boom is based on minerals, mainly
diamonds. To be blessed with mineral wealth is
fortunate, but not so unusual. What is exceptional in
Botswana's case is the way that mineral revenues
have been managed. It has built up substantial
reserves and avoided large foreign debt. Improved
physical and social infrastructure was an early
priority for public investment. As a result, the rural
infrastructure in Botswana, in terms of roads,
schools and clinics, is vastly superior to most
other African countries.
The country has so far successfully weathered one
set-back in its economic growth, when diamond
exports temporarily collapsed in 1981 and 1982. In
the 1990s, it is facing more profound economic
change. As diamond prices fall and no new mines
are being developed, the growth in government rev-
enue has begun to taper off. Yet public expendi-
ture continues to rise. For the first time for many
years, the government budget has gone into deficit.
The pressure is mounting for greater fiscal austerity,
which will certainly have an impact on drought relief
expenditure. At the same time, levels of donor
support for drought relief in the 1980s have not
been sustained into the 1990s.
2.2 Poverty
Despite Botswana's economic success, poverty, espe-
cially rural poverty, continues to be a serious prob-
lem. The latest National Development Plan (NDP 7)
estimates that about 55 per cent of the population
falls below the poverty line (MFDP 1991). Develop-
ment in rural areas has not kept pace with the rapid
growth in other parts of the economy. There is struc-
tural rural unemployment despite the rapid growth
of formal sector employment over the last 20 years. A
Labour Force Survey in 1984/85 showed average
unemployment rates in rural areas of 23.5 per cent,
and 27.4 per cent for women (CSO 1985).
The characteristics of the rural poor are:
56
i little or no involvement in formal wage em-
ployment;
ii a weak asset base, with very few livestock; and
iii dependence on small-scale arable agriculture.
These people are most vulnerable to drought. A
significant proportion are female headed households.
The drought in the 1980s did not seem to increase
income disparities very much between rich and poor.
This has been attributed to the income diversifica-
tion of rural households, and to significant private
and public transfers during drought, including
the DRP (Valentine 1993). Income distribution was
already quite highly skewed (CSO 1988). But drought
did exacerbate the inequitable distribution of cattle,
which is the main determinant of wealth in Bot-
swana. The percentage of farmers without cattle
rose from 28 per cent in 1980 to 39 per cent in
1987 (Ministry of Agriculture 1980 and 1987).
The problem of structural poverty is most extreme
in the case of the Remote Area Dwellers. Their tradi-
tional source of livelihood, hunting and gathering,
has been continuously eroded as population and
especially livestock densities have increased, en-
croaching on their traditional hunting lands. They
have been forced slowly to seek alternatives, of
which there are currently very few, and they have
gradually been drifting into specially established
settlements, dependent ort welfare.
2.3 National Food Security
Botswana is a very dry country3, and has never been
able to grow all its food needs. It has been heavily
reliant on food imports, mostly from neighbouring
countries like South Africa and Zimbabwe. Since
the early 1980s, it has regularly imported about 90
per cent of its cereal requirements (of about 200,000t
per year). With a well-developed private sector and
no shortage of foreign exchange, Botswana has usu-
ally been well able to meet national food needs
through trade. Nevertheless, it pursued a policy of
cereal self-sufficiency until 1990, when it was recog-
nized that this would be both difficult and costly to
achieve in a country of marginal arable potential. The
policy has now been modified to food security through
domestic production and imports. Drought obviously
has a very disruptive effect on food production. Be-
tween 1968 and 1984, the coefficient of variation for
cereal production was as high as 59 per cent.
2This section is mainly based on Harvey 1992. all varies from 650mm in the extreme north-east to less than
250mm in the south east.
Table 1: Estimated Total Value to Beneficiaries of Drought Relief Programme In
Botswana (PuIa)(1)
COMPONENT [ YEAR
1988/87 1987/88 1988/89
Value Value Value
000 Puta) (00O Puta) (O0D Pula)
A Human rellef
programmes
(5)
3 OVERVIEW OF THE DROUGHT RELIEF
PROGRAMME
At least 20 of the last 30 years have been 'drought
years' in Botswana. It is clearly an endemic prob-
lem; Botswana is a very dry country, prone to
sequences of even drier years. On this basis, the
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Constant 1986 prices Average exchange rate in 1986: $l=Pula 1,87k
ARAP comprised eight components. All are included in these calculations except the te1ilizer
component
Refers to amount allocated, due to lack of data on amount disbursed,
Loans held by other commercial banks and Botswana Cooperative Bank were also written off, but
have not been Included here.
Totals may not add due to rounding.
Sources: Food Resources Dept. of Ministry of Local Government and Lands, ARAP Annual
Reports, Livestock Advisory Centre, miscellaneous drought relief papers, NDB.
case for integrating drought relief into longer term
development programmes is irrefutable. Drought is
not a one-off event.
Many survival strategies from the past are no longer
viable. The mobility of hunter gatherers has been
1. Supplementaty feeding
programme 60848 65
2, LBRP 8MB 9
3, Handstamping 846 1
Sub-total (7O142 75)
B Agr1cuRuraI relisE
programmes
4, ARAP(2) 21287 23
5. Uvestock teed subsidy t836 2
8, LIvestock vaçclnes(3) 220 <1
7. Borehole subsidy(3) 487 <1
8. NDB toan wrfteoffs(4)
Sub-total (23810 25)
TOTAL 93982 lOO
55Th? 56 12697
t2O44 12 1 0559
838 8 n/a
(68669 89) (23x256
28,291 29 25939 37
1455 1 o
200 <1 o
423 'cl n/a
20404
(30369 31) f 46343
99O38 100 69599 100
(5) (5)
restricted, as mentioned above. Pastoralist migra-
fions with cattle are also limited, by the construction
of disease control fences. As the effectiveness of
these kinds of coping strategies has been eroded, the
government has stepped in with a large-scale admin-
istered relief programme. There have been four
phases of relief since the severe drought of the 1960s:
i 1979/80: a short-lived relief programme, which
encountered many problems, but the evaluation of
which informed the design of the subsequent relief
programme of the 1980s;
ii 1981 /82-1 987: a large-scale relief programme,
with many different components;
iii 1988/89-1990: a drought recovery programme
which focused on arable agriculture and livestock;
and
iv 1991/92-1993/94: the drought relief programme
was reinstated, taking on board some of the lessons
learned from the 1980s.
This article is mainly concerned with the period from
1981/82 to 1990. There were eight different compo-
nents to the DRP: a supplementary feeding pro-
gramme, labour based relief programme (LBRP, or
public works), 'handstamping',4 accelerated rainfed
arable production programme (ARAP), livestock
feed subsidy, provision of livestock vaccines, a
borehole subsidy and loan write-offs by the National
Development Bank (NDB).
Tables 1 and 2 show the estimated value to benefici-
aries of each different component during the peak
years of the relief operation in 1986/87 and 1987/88,
and during the first year of the drought recovery
programme in 1988/89. The human relief pro-
grammes, which were mostly progressive in nature
providing most assistance to the neediest house-
holds, were more important in the first half of the
1980s. As Table 1 shows, t1 ere was a major shift from
the human to the agricu ural programmes in the
second half of the 1980s, from 1985 onwards. The
DRP gradually became more regressive as time
went by. Table 2 shows that the arable agricultural
and livestock programmes were more valuable per
beneficiary than the human relief programmes,5 yet
4This refers to the manual grinding of grain for school feeding.
Data on the borehole subsidies in 1985/86 show that the average
grant per farmer was P794. For the following years data on the
number of individual farmers who benefited are unavailable. Only
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the benefits were not so widespread, and did not
always reach the poorest, the NDB loan write-off
being the most extreme case where almost 30 per cent
of relief assistance went to less than 1 per cent of the
population, most of whom were commercial farmers.
The success of the DRP has rightly been attributed to
the political will of government to make it work.
Indeed, it has gathered political momentum
throughout the 1980s. It was described as a
'persuasive vote-winner' for the Botswarta Demo-
cratic Party in the 1984 national elections (Morgan
1986: 33). The annual declaration about whether
the DRP is going to continue each year, delivered
by the President,6 has had a high profile.
The DRP has also been a very expensive programme
to run. Between 1984 and 1987, it accounted for 14 to
18 per cent of total government development ex-
penditure, costing over $50 million at its peak in
1987/88. This level of expenditure is probably
unaffordable in the 1990s. After the evaluation of
the DRP, government policy has started to shift
towards a more targeted approach to drought
relief, with the aim of abandoning some of the least
successful components identified in the evaluation,
such as the livestock feed subsidy (FSG et al. 1990).
But the policy debate about drought response was
overtaken by events in 1991/92, when the rains
failed again. The government unexpectedly had to
re-launch the DRP which was still in the process
of being modified. However, Botswana's long expe-
rience of relief and well-developed institutional
structures for dealing with drought, meant that
it was much better placed than most other countries
in Southern Africa to launch a quick and effective
response.
4 INTEGRATING RELIEF ADMINISTRATION
INTO EXISTING GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS:
AVOIDING PARALLEL RELIEF STRUCTURES
The institutional distinction between relief and de-
velopment is usually sharpest within the bureaucra-
cies of overseas aid agencies, in terms of budgets,
procedures and political eligibility. Because Bot-
swana has been able to respond to drought inde-
pendently, minimizing its reliance on foreign aid,
it has been free to develop its own institutional
-
-
-
the number of syndicates benefiting has been monitored.
6 Rural Development Council and the Inter-Ministerial Drought
Committee are responsible for making recommendations each year
to Cabinet about the need for drought relief.
Table 2: Estimated Number f Beneficiaries of DRP and Average Vah,ie Received
per Beneficiary in Botswana (Pula)
* Average value per beneficiary or group, at 1986 constant rjces,
Number of beneficlades overestimated because farmers can benefit from more than one of the
eight components of ARAR.
Borehole subsidies allocated to syndicates of farmers. Therefore number of beneficiaries refers
to number of syndicates.
1,593 refers to number of loans written off by NOB In 1988/89, but one farmer could hold more than
one loan.
See also notes for Table 1 Data is not availabiG f*r number of beneficiaries of the livestock feed
subsidy and livestock vaccination programmes.
Sources: Food Resources Dept. of Ministry of Local Government and Lands, ARAR Annual
Reports, Livestock Advisory Centre, miscellaneous drought relief papers, NOB.
system for planning and administering relief, with-
out being heavily influenced by foreign donors.
It has succeeded remarkably well in integrating
the administration of the DRP into existing institu-
tional systems, and as far as possible has avoided
setting up temporary structures which, Holm and
Morgan note, 'provide excellent opportunities for
corruption and foreign manipulation' (1985: 469).
On the contrary, the government in Botswana has
benefited from a high level of accountability,
high civil service morale, and low levels of
corruption (Wallis 1990).
Overall control of the DRP lies with the Ministry of
Finance and Development Planning (MFDP). The
central role of the MFDP ensures that drought relief
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is not marginalized, and helps to ensure the timely
release of funds (CogilI 1990). Other ministries have
expanded their existing functions to accommodate
the DRP. For example, the Ministry of Agriculture
administers its relief and recovery programmes
through its network of extension and veterinary
staff; the Ministry of Health administers most of the
feeding programmes through its staff in the rural
health clinics. On the early warning side, Botswana
has mostly developed and refined existing monitor-
ing systems and has avoided the temptation of set-
ting up parallel systems (ibid.).
The key to coordinating the DRP is a number of
sub-committees to the long established Rural Devel-
opment Council. These include the Inter-Ministerial
COMPONENT 1988/87
No of Average
Beneficiaries Value
YEAR
1987/88
No of Average
Beneficiaries Value'
1988189
No ot Average
Beneficiaries Value'
Supplementary
feeding programme 611,218 99.55 587,408 94,97 133,108 95.39
LBRP 75,000 112.64 90,000 133.82 n/a n/a
Handstamping 7,500 112.74 8,000 1 0477 n/a n/a
ARAR (1) 92,265 230.72 160,560 17621 160,970 161,14
Borehole subsidy (2) 47 9,936.00 48 8,806.00 n/a n/a
NDB Iofl write offs(3) 1,593 12,813.00
Drought Committee (IMDC), which is the forum for
bringing the concerned ministries together, and the
Early Warning Technical Committee (EWTC). Once
again, parallel structures have been avoided. At
national level responsibility for relief and develop-
ment is well integrated.
At district level, the Drought Relief Committees
(DDRC) have similarly been integrated under the
existing District Development Committees. Chaired
by the District Commissioner, the DDRC has the
status to be taken seriously. But it is at this level that
the down side of loading extra work onto existing
institutions becomes apparent. District officers are
ultimately responsible for implementing the DRP on
the ground. In a number of cases, the huge adminis-
trative demands of the DRP have simply displaced
ongoing development work. This was most acute in
the case of agricultural extension staff, who more or
less became clerks for the ARAP programme, admin-
istering drought relief subsidies at the expense of
their regular extension work.
In some cases, expatriates provided the necessary
technical manpower. During the 1980s, foreign vol-
unteers provided technical management for the
LBRP. This was a temporary solution, with the long
term cost that their experience was lost when they
left the country. During the recent relief operation,
district administrations have again been struggling
with a shortage of skilled technical manpower to run
the now much expanded public works programme.
Thus, despite its successes in integrating relief and
development on the institutional front, Botswana is
still grappling with the problem of how to scale up
and scale down on the staffing side, especially on
public works, whilst applying the principle that
existing institutions should be used.
5 WAS THE DROUGHT RELIEF PROGRAMME
COMPATIBLE WITH LONG TERM
DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES?
The approach to drought relief during the 1980s
was to provide temporary food, water and income
support. These objectives were achieved. At its
peak, the feeding programme provided food rations
to 60 per cent of the population. The direct welfare
objectives of the DRP were most successfully met:
entitlements were protected, there was no famine,
and malnutrition was contained. This is an impres-
sive record. But to what extent did the programmes
contribute to development in the longer term? This
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section selects three components of the DRP which
are most relevant to this issue: the public works
programme, the livestock feed subsidy, and ARAP,
which was part of the recovery phase. The modified
approach to drought relief in the 1990s, as a result
of lessons learned during the 1980s, is also briefly
reviewed.
5.1 Public works programme
The LBRP is one of the clearest examples of an
attempt to link relief and development objectives.
The primary objective was welfare related, to sup-
plement the incomes of those most affected by
drought. The secondary objective was to create so-
cially useful or productive enterprises, such as
schools and housing for teachers, and community
gardens. At its peak in 1987/88, the LBRP employed
around 90,000 employees, just over 20 per cent of
the rural working population. By far the majority
were women.
The benefits of LBRP were widespread. It success-
fully addressed the problem of drought induced loss
of income and employment. Most of the infrastruc-
ture created was deemed socially useful to rural
communities and, especially in remote rural areas,
contributed to improved services being made avail-
able in the longer term (although the productive
enterprises were less successful, because of subse-
quent managerial problems) (Buchanan-Smith
1990). The conflict arose when welfare objectives
were not compatible with productivity objectives.
Not surprisingly, the welfare objectives were over-
riding. Large amounts of money were disbursed, but
there was no commercial incentive to employ the
most productive applicants. Priority was given to
those temporarily destitute because of drought. Pro-
ductivity suffered, sometimes severely, as a result,
and projects were rarely subjected to more than a
rudimentary economic analysis (Rockliffe-King 1990).
The programme is perceived to have been a success.
But there are aspects of the impact which are still
unknown: for example, the impact on women's
workload; and the impact of paying a low wage rate,
for self-targeting reasons, but which is regarded as
lower than the 'subsistence wage rate' (Manamela
1993). These issues demand urgent investigation.
Government policy has now moved towards an
even closer integration of relief and development
objectives, by adopting a permanent programme of
Labour Intensive Public Works (LIPW), to help ad-
dress structural unemployment, and to be scaled up
in times of drought. This was attempted during
the most recent relief operation, when the LIPW
became the central component of the whole pro-
gramme, creating a record 100,000 jobs7. The logistics
of scaling up were not so easy, because of a short-
age of skilled technical and managerial staff at
district level, as mentioned above. Once again
there was a conflict between employing as many
people as possible, and achieving acceptable produc-
tivity levels. The former objective dominated. A
number of ministries were encouraged to acceler-
ate development programmes planned under NDP
7 in order to increase rural employment. This seems
to have worked, except that some ministries,
including Agriculture, were not always prepared
to go for maximum employment at the expense of
the quality of construction.
5.2 Livestock feed subsidy
This was the most valuable of the different forms of
assistance provided to the livestock sector. It ran
from 1982/83 until 1988, during which time the
level of subsidy gradually increased, to its peak in
1986/87. Large herd-owners were the main benefici-
aries, partly because they could afford to pay for
transportation of the feed from the depots of the
Livestock Advisory Centre where it was made avail-
able to their farms, and because there was no ceiling
on the amount of feed that could be bought by any
one herd owner.
Cattle ownership in Botswana is already very un-
equal. This programme did nothing to redress the
balance; in fact it probably worsened it. During the
drought years of the 1980s, mortality rates increased
marginally for the large herds, but substantially for
the small herds.
In terms of compatibility with long term develop-
ment objectives, the programme was flawed. It
encouraged the maintenance of cattle numbers
throughout the drought, increasing pressure on de-
clining grazing resources. Recognizing the inappro-
priateness of this subsidy, the government dropped
this component of the DRP in the recent relief pro-
gramme of the 1990s. This was achieved in spite of
pressure from the powerful agricultural lobby.
Instead, taxes at the abattoir were reduced and the
benefits passed onto farmers in the form of higher
prices, thus encouraging higher offtake during
Because of job rotation, the number of people employed is even
higher.
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drought, which is a more reasonable economic and
environmental response. The full impact of this new
approach is yet to be analysed, but the abattoirs did
attract increased numbers of cattle, although it is not
yet known to what extent communal or commercial
farmers benefited.
5.3 ARAP
This was the most expensive component of the DRP
for the Government of Botswana (Amis 1990). It was
part of the recovery programme from 1985 to 1990.
ARAP was supposed to be non-discriminatory, so
that all farmers could benefit. It involved the
subsidization of a number of different agricultural
activities, of which a subsidy on ploughing was the
largest and most important. This programme was
specifically designed to provide a link from relief to
development by increasing arable production and
thereby enhancing rural development and welfare
through increased incomes. It was supposed to
optimize rural income distribution by concentrating
on all farming households and reducing rural urban
migration.
In practice, there were many problems associated
with ARAP. It effectively reduced the risk of cultiva-
tion for arable farmers, but there was no direct
link between the subsidies and final output. Thus,
ploughing became an end in itself in order to
benefit from the generous subsidy, with negative
environmental consequences if large areas were
ploughed up but not cultivated (Rockliffe-King 1990).
A small number of tractor owners were the main
beneficiaries, as well as unintended beneficiaries
because of some misappropriation of funds
(Buchanan-Smith 1990). Also, as mentioned above,
Ministry of Agriculture staff were overwhelmed by
administration of ARAP towards the end of the
1980s. A potentially important rural development
programme, the Arable Lands Development Pro-
;ramme (ALDEP), which is one of the few tar-
eted at small-scale arable farmers, who are
amongst the poorest in rural Botswana, was virtu-
ally paralysed. This was one of the long term
costs of the ARAP programme (Rockliffe-King
1990).
Recognizing the weaknesses of ARAP, a govern-
ment White Paper on drought response in 1991
(Government of Botswana 1991) proposed that it
should be abandoned. But in 1992, it was reinstated
Most of the food distributed through the Supplementary Feeding
Programme was donated food aid.
under political pressure, and has once again
absorbed large amounts of money.
6 PLANNING FOR DROUGHT
To a considerable extent, endemic drought has
been incorporated into development planning in
Botswana. Even during the plentiful years of rain
in the 1970s, the government commissioned work on
a drought strategy for the livestock sector, with a
certain amount of foresight. The Botswana Society
held a national conference on drought in 1978. One
year later, the country was in the grip of its first
serious drought since the 1960s.
Of course, the most difficult part is the planning
stage at the beginning of a relief operation, when it is
not known for how long the drought will continue.
At the beginning of the 1980s, a series of short
term relief measures were put together, with no
notion that most of them would continue for eight
years and would therefore dominate the workload of
some civil servants for so long, displacing regular
development activities. However, the government of
Botswana does have a strong record of evaluating
its past attempts at drought relief, and taking the
lessons on board in planning and implementing
future relief operations. This was the case after the
1979/80 relief operation, and after the DRP of the
1980s. There has been a high level of debate within
government about drought relief, and a strong com-
mitment to learning lessons.
The extent to which the government has planned for
post drought recovery as well as drought relief is
unusual. This was a prominent feature of the 6th
National Development Plan for the period 1985-
1991, with specific budgetry commitments for re-
covery (Morgan 1986). Drought in Botswana has
tended to follow a cyclical pattern. NDP 7 was based
on the assumption that drought would not recur
before 1997. This assumption has already been
proved wrong, although the plan did calculate
the effect on government expenditure if relief
programmes were re-instated, that it would increase
by 3 to 4 per cent. The unexpected effect of the
current relief programme on plans and targets
remains to be seen.
7 'DROUGHT-PROOFING' IN THE LONG TERM
As drought is such a regular feature of life in Bot-
swana, the real challenge is how to bring about
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'more rural development with less rain' (Food
Studies Group et al. 1990). The evaluation of the 1980s
DRP claimed that 'the conceptual distinction be-
tween relief...and development. ..is blurred exactly
because 'normal' times are not satisfactory for many
rural dwellers' (Rockliffe-King 1990: 35). This is
not what linking relief and development should be
about. But the DRP did end up financing both
poverty alleviation and poverty avoidance, under
the banner of drought relief. For a while, it masked
underlying structural problems and inequalities, and
therefore delayed difficult policy decisions about
how to tackle the problems of rural development to
'drought-proof' the rural economy in the long term.
The poorest rural households are often most de-
pendent on arable agriculture, having few other
resources at their disposal. Yet it is traditional arable
agriculture which has been most neglected in agri-
cultural policy, and specifically research. The rural
poor, including small-scale arable farmers, have
tended to be marginalized from the main sources of
growth in the economy, in the livestock sector and
more recently in urban areas. The DRP effectively
protected them from drought, but rather little has
been done to 'drought-proof' their livelihoods in the
longer term.
Some of these issues are now being addressed
under NDP 7, which acknowledges 'problems of
structural poverty, lack of employment opportuni-
ties and income and asset ownership disparities'
(MFDP 1991: 17). Despite the successes of the DR!',
rural poverty has worsened during the 1980s leaving
more families vulnerable to drought in the future.
NDP 7 emphasizes the need to create income earning
opportunities in rural areas, give greater priority to
water conservation and management efficiency, and
develop a rural works programme for non-drought
as well as drought years.
A positive move since the 1980s has been to delink
some welfare programmes which address structural
poverty from the DRP, for example for Remote Area
Dwellers. The DRP evaluation concluded that 'the
acceptance and institution of welfare provision as a
regular feature of government practice in Botswana
has been matched by very few countries in Africa'
(Rockliffe-King 1990: 8). Since the 1970s, Botswana
has had the basis of a social security system. The
National Policy on Destitutes, formulated in 1980, is
a key component, whereby an individual may be
registered as 'destitute' according to carefully
defined criteria, and may receive a monthly food
coupon. A positive feature of linking relief and
development is the expansion of existing welfare
policies during drought years. For example, the Na-
tional Policy on Destitutes was expanded to make
temporary provision for 'drought destitutes', and the
supplementary feeding programme was a much ex-
panded version of a regular feeding programme
for medically selected beneficiaries. The welfare
systems are in place, but what is lacking is policy
to eradicate poverty.
8 CONCLUSIONS
Botswana's record in preventing famine has been
impressive. Its performance in linking relief and
development, according to the criteria set out at the
beginning of this article, is mixed and more com-
plex. Because drought recurs with such frequency,
there is an imperative to get this right.
On the institutional side, the government of Bot-
swana has successfully integrated the administra-
tion of drought relief into existing structures. It has
avoided the undesirable alternative of creating
separate new institutions, which can become costly
'white elephants', redundant in non-drought years,
and which can encourage the treatment of short
term shocks as something entirely separate from
the development process. Some of the direct welfare
components of the DRP were most successful
where they involved scaling up from existing social
welfare programmes, such as the National Destitutes
Policy.
The DRP of the 1980s was unusual in going for the
twin objectives of protecting incomes from the
effects of drought, and maintaining the productive
capacity of rural areas. Thus, it tried to bridge the
gap between welfare needs and longer term
development goals. In practice, the second objective
was hardest to achieve. ARAP and the livestock
feed subsidy are testimony to this. Both were
regressive in terms of who benefited, and ended
up being at odds with longer term development
interests. In recognition of this, the government
subsequently tried to abandon both programmes,
but only succeeded in the case of the livestock
feed subsidy.
See following page for References.
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The prolonged DRP, stretching over eight years,
also tended to mask the underlying structural
problems of development in rural areas. One of
the reasons for the success of Botswana's DRP
has often been attributed to the political will to
make it work. It is important to recognize that
there is a down side to this as well. There are
political interests in perpetuating the DRP, not
only because of the direct benefits to certain power-
ful political lobbies including rural elites, (which
is one reason why ARAP was not abandoned), but
also because it is a convenient temporary solution
for dealing with rural poverty.
NDP 7, however, shows a commitment to move on
from this state of affairs, address some of the under-
lying causes of poverty, and try and 'drought-
proof' the rural economy in a number of different
ways. As the amount of public sector resources
available for drought relief in the 1990s is unlikely
to be as large as it was in the 1980s, the need for
'drought-proofing' is all the more urgent. It is not
easy to achieve.
Botswana's conditions are unique, and it is therefore
inappropriate to attempt a wholesale transfer of its
experience to other African countries. But there are
areas where lessons can be learned. Public works
are in vogue as a form of relief in many other
African countries, popular because they are seen
to fulfil both relief and development objectives.
As Botswana has found, these objectives can con-
flict. Notice should be taken of Botswana's
logistical difficulties in managing a large-scale
public works programme, despite the fact that it
has a much better resourced civil service and local
administration than most other African countries
and a very small population. There are also still a
number of unknowns about the impact of the
LBRP/LIPW in Botswana, especially on women
and their workload. More generally, Botswana is
better placed than most other countries in Africa
to experiment with different approaches to relief,
for example maintaining livestock herds with sub-
sidized feed programmes versus finding ways of
increasing offtake of cattle. These experiments
should be closely monitored and the results dis-
seminated widely as they can make a valuable
contribution to relief planning elsewhere.
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